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With monotonous regularity since the late 1980s nongovernmental organisations 
(NGOs), politicians or think tanks have predicted a water war. Recently, a UK 
minister predicted war in the coming decades (Harvey 2012). No such thing 
has happened, though, and prominent water scholars have argued a war fought 
strictly over water is unlikely in the future (Wolf 1996; Allan 2001).
That does not mean there is peace and harmony among co-riparians. Power 
differences and latent conflicts persist, usually under the radar of the basin 
hegemon (or dominant power), but in full view of those who live their effects. 
The state of affairs in many transboundary basins can be characterised as a mix 
of cooperation and conflict (Mirumachi and Allan 2007), with those benefitting 
from the status quo emphasising the former. Our first article on the subject 
called this the ‘ugly’ side of cooperation (Zeitoun and Mirumachi 2008).
A clue to understanding this situation, we argue in its sequel (Zeitoun et al. 
2011), is to look at what lies beneath: how power is exercised. The ‘water 
wars’ discourse has simplistically focused on the exercise of hard power, 
predominantly violence and coercion. Both philosophical reasoning (Hannah 
Arendt) and empirically grounded hydropolitical work (Dinar 2009) has shown, 
however, that rule based on fear and brute power has little hope in the long 
term. Some kind of legitimacy and consent is needed to perpetuate any skewed 
transboundary water arrangement based on unequal power relations. 
Empirically, we find relations between riparians to be governed by a wider 
spectrum of power instruments, from side payments and bribery to persuasion 
and inciting desire to emulating success. This wide range of nonviolent, co-
optative power manifestations is collectively known as ‘soft’ power: getting 
others to want what you want. Nye (1990)  sought to explain how relations 
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can be peaceful through the power of attraction without the need for a threat 
of violence. We find, however, that soft power not only contains the positive 
power of attraction, but also its negative, repellence away from certain agendas 
and issues, and towards maintenance of a biased status quo.
Nye was reiterating Machiavelli’s understanding of power as a centaur, half man 
(arguably rational), half horse (based on strength). He was far more optimistic 
than Machiavelli about human progress towards eternal peace, buttressed 
by freedom and trade. Fragmented evidence to support this hope exists in 
transboundary water contexts; many treaties never really came off the ground, 
and even in highly integrated Europe, diplomatic crises over water are not 
unheard of (Warner and van Buuren 2009).
A soft power perspective may not yet be sophisticated enough to explain power 
relations between riparians. Our analytical framework of ‘hydro-hegemony’ 
(Zeitoun and Warner 2006)  highlights how conflict, even if it is not open 
and visible, can be structurally present between riparians (and groundwater 
users from transboundary aquifers). In an integrated transboundary water 
configuration, interests between dominant and subordinate are harmonious; in 
a distributed power configuration, they are fundamentally at odds. Cooperation 
by the non-hegemonic actor, or its compliance with certain states of affairs, does 
not necessarily mean consensus. Successful framing by the stronger party of 
the common good (soft power), however, can result in power differences going 
uncontested and countries signing treaties that bring highly differential benefits. 
Unqualified calls for and claims to transboundary cooperation ‘of any sort, no 
matter how slight’ (UNDP 2006)  are therefore as wrongheaded as are alarms 
over water wars. Policy and programs promoting unqualified ‘cooperation’ were 
criticised on the grounds that negative forms of cooperation need reform or 
resolution, not management or encouragement.
The ‘hydro-hegemony’ framework is indebted to the Gramscian concept of 
hegemony as ingrained in material and ideational structures pervading social 
systems (Selby 2005; Davidson-Harden et al. 2007).  River negotiations are 
multi-level power games (Warner 2008) in which state representatives are the 
lynchpin. Representatives of hydro-hegemons can deny there being conflict 
and appear magnanimous, while knowing full well that the odds are stacked 
in their favour. State representatives may frame their water interest in non-
contestable security terms (Buzan et al. 1998). Whether picked up, amplified 
and given material support, or purposely backgrounded, such discursive 
framing of issues matters.
A useful example is that of Egypt’s long claim of a veto on any upstream ‘arrest’ 
of Nile waters for consumptive use, through irrigation reservoirs, distribution 
systems and the like. Underpinned by one of the largest armies in the region, the 
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national government has previously declared upstream dam-building to be a casus 
belli (a legitimate reason to start a war) should it lead to lower inflow into Egypt 
(Warner et al. 2012). It could be argued that this threat has prevented Ethiopia, 
the Blue Nile upstream power, from building dams in the past; alternatively 
there is also the material reality that the country could hardly fund and realise 
its own dam infrastructure. This penury is worsened by the stipulation of (once) 
key multilateral funders that they will not fund transboundary projects lacking 
the endorsement of all riparian sates. The balance of power in favour of Egypt 
relies on the moral and material support of the United States, to which it is one 
of the biggest allies in the region.
But it’s not all about hard power. After Gamel Abdel Nasser’s 1952 revolution, 
the nationalisation of the Suez Canal and the building of the Aswan Dam, Egypt 
became a respected southern leader. The government organised or condoned 
several cooperative, technical and political water fora about the river Nile 
(UNDUGU, TECCONILE, Nile 2002) on the unstated premise that these bodies 
would not tamper with Egypt’s self-ascribed water rights, laid down in treaties 
agreed with Sudan, but none of the other Nile riparians, in 1929 and 1959. 
The government of Anwar Sadat signed a Camp David treaty with Israel, which 
anointed the country as a ‘peacemaker’ in the eyes of influential superpowers, 
and the country has seen prominent nationals (Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Mahmoud 
Abu-Zeid) ascend to leadership positions in multilateral institutions, bestowing 
upon Egypt an aura of authority and legitimacy in the United Nations (UN) 
world order. In everyday interaction, upstream states have for decades refrained 
from taking action against Egypt’s interest without prodding.
A recent shift in the Nilotic water-sharing status quo over the past (half-) 
decade, however, seems to reflect a shift in the hegemonic power balance. Egypt 
is arguably not as important to American interests as it used to be, while its 
upstream neighbours do not appear to be as intimidated by Egypt as they once 
were. Opposition to Egypt’s unilateral hegemony have been voiced by Tanzania 
and Uganda since the 1960s. It was not until 2010 that the upstream states 
signed their own agreement without Egypt (Nicol and Cascao 2011). 
External direct investment, especially from China and the Gulf states, has 
dramatically improved the bargaining and economic position of upstream 
countries. China has used its own soft power through the provision of 
investment to these countries: buying oil in Sudan, supporting the giant 
Grand Ethiopian Renaissance (Millennium) Dam, and investing in land in 
several Nile states. China’s non-interference in political relations and the 
persuasive example of its own economic success raises goodwill. Moreover, 
Egypt’s relative international standing as an ‘example’ has also seen a slide, 
following allegations of human-rights violations, alienation from Israel, and 
failing megaprojects under Hosni Mubarak. 
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Nile politics telescoped in 2011. While Egypt was enmeshed in its February 
revolution, South Sudan gained independence and Ethiopia inaugurated its 
big dam. Ethiopia’s 6000 megawatt hydropower dam, with an estimated cost 
of US$4.5 billion, is largely self-funded from bonds and taxes. Two Egyptian 
governments have since protested loudly, first using the language of casus belli, 
then calling for negotiation and finally, in 2013, proposing joint funding. As 
the dam is located only 20 kilometres from the Ethio-Sudanese border, a dam 
collapse would flood the Sudanese capital of Khartoum. Overall, however, Sudan 
stands to benefit from the dam in terms of better flood regulation, irrigation 
and a nearby source of hydropower, and would gain from approximation to 
Ethiopia. Sudan, however, has so far sided with Egypt in its refusal to sign the 
Nile treaty, at least officially, suggesting Egypt's soft power is still palpable if 
dwindling (Hamzawy 2010). Egypt currently has little realistic alternative to 
joining the new arena of Nile negotiations and no longer holds de-facto veto 
power over major upstream projects like Ethiopia’s dam. 
Power dynamics, such as those noted in the above example, show that no matter 
how hegemonic or even dominant a state, its hard and soft power are ultimately 
fluid. Examination of the soft-power subtext helps us understand what’s 
going on in basins around the world. Similar analyses are not only applicable 
to the familiarly contentious Euphrates/Tigris, Jordan, Ganges, Brahmaputra 
and Colorado basins, but also to seemingly peaceful European transboundary 
streams such as the Rhine and Scheldt (Zeitoun and Warner 2006, Warner 
and van Buuren 2009).  The incorporation of soft power into the analysis of 
conflicts in hegemonic contexts provides insight into the choices riparian 
states (can) make or avoid in their transboundary water interaction; and into 
how negotiations and treaties can lead towards conflict management but not 
necessarily to conflict resolution.
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